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OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER: A SLOW BEGINNING 
While the long-term efficacy of the bounty program offered by the SEC’s 
Office of the Whistleblower is still unclear, as the Office enters its fourth year 
it is safe to say that its progress thus far has been slow. The Office was created 
after the SEC’s repeated dismissal of valuable information that could have 
exposed Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme years before it was finally put to a 
stop.1 This very public debacle made it evident that the SEC was not equipped 
to handle the volume of whistleblower tips it was receiving, and a new vehicle 
would be needed to process tips and separate the proverbial wheat from the 
chaff. A product of the 2010 Dodd-Frank legislation,2 the Office of the 
Whistleblower is designed to serve this function and help the SEC “act swiftly 
to protect investors from harm and bring violators to justice.”3 
Despite this lofty goal, the Office has taken time to gain footing. During 
2011, the inaugural year of the program, no awards were paid out.4 With only 
one whistleblower receiving an award in fiscal year 20125 and four in 2013,6 
the number of payouts has remained low. Although some practitioners take the 
view that these initial payments have set a precedent and will lead to a “tidal 
wave of cases coming as a result of whistleblowers,”7 it is hard to deny that 
these numbers are underwhelming. This is not, however, due to a lack of 
 
 1 See generally Allan Chernoff, Madoff Whistleblower Blasts SEC, CNNMONEY (February 4, 2009. 1:29 
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/02/04/news/newsmakers/madoff_whistleblower/. 
 2 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-7 (2012). Subsection (d) directs the SEC to create the body that is now known as 
the Office of the Whistleblower. 
 3 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-
FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM (2013), at 1, available at: http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-
report-2013.pdf (last visited January 18, 2014).  
 4 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DODD-FRANK 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FISCAL YEAR 2011 (2011), at 8, available at: 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/whistleblower-annual-report-2011.pdf (last visited January 18, 2014). 
The Office began work in the second half of 2011 and attributes the lack of payouts in 2011 to procedures that 
prevented the timely reviewing of claims until the following year.  
 5 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DODD-FRANK 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FISCAL YEAR 2012 (2012), at 8, available at: 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-report-2012.pdf (last visited January 18, 2014). 
 6 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 14. The Office paid an award to an additional whistleblower 
after the close of fiscal year 2013, bringing the total published number of awards to six. Id at 14‒15. 
 7 See Walter Pavio, What the SEC Whistleblower Report Means for Companies. FORBES (Nov. 18, 2013, 
12:51 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2013/11/18/sec-releases-whistleblower-report-here-is-
what-it-means-for-companies/ (quoting Jordan Thomas, Partner and Chair of the Whistleblower 
Representation Practice, Labaton Sucharow).  
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people coming forward with information. Although the number of payouts 
remains in the single digits, the yearly report the Office provides to Congress 
indicates that the total number of tips received is in the thousands. In 2011 the 
Office received 334 tips (note that the 2011 data only covers a seven-week 
period), followed by 3,001 in 2012 and 3,238 in 2013.8 This discrepancy 
between the large amount of tips received and the comparatively small number 
of payouts might be the result of the somewhat disconnected relationship the 
Office maintains with the rest of the SEC, including its Division of 
Enforcement. 
Contrary to what one might expect, the Office is not directly involved in 
enforcement actions against corporate wrongdoers. According to Sean 
McKessy, the Office’s Chief, when the Office receives a tip it is looked at by a 
team of SEC “attorneys, accountants, and analysts,”9 including “at least two 
SEC attorneys.”10 These are the individuals that decide whether the tip has 
merit. When a tip is found to have no merit or is otherwise unhelpful, that will 
end the matter and the tip provider will likely never receive any 
communication from the Office. If the tip is potentially helpful, but the SEC’s 
Enforcement Division is already investigating the matter, the tip is turned over 
to that division, and that is likely the end of the Office’s involvement.11 
Although the Office is careful to show Congress that it is making use of its 
dedicated funds,12 it is not clear that successful enforcement actions resulting 
from quality tips directly figure into Congress’ assessment of the Office’s 
viability. 
When a tip is found meritorious and eventually leads to a new investigation 
by the applicable division within the SEC, this is a process that can “take 
months or even years” to be completed.13 Notably, the Office is under no 
obligation to advise whistleblowers as to the progress or outcome of any 
investigation it pursues. The burden is on the tip provider to continually check 
the Office’s website for a Notice of Covered Action until the tipster recognizes 
a case involving their tip.14 Furthermore, the tip provider has only a ninety-day 
 
 8 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 8. 
 9 Sean McKessy, What Happens to Tips, SEC OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/owb-what-happens-to-tips.shtml (last visited April 12, 2014). 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 See generally ANNUAL REPORT’S, supra notes 3, 4, and 5. 
 13 Sean McKessy, supra note 9. 
 14 Id. 
HUSLAK GALLEYSFINAL 1/13/2015  7:45 AM 
2014] OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER 97 
window to claim their reward after the Notice is posted.15 This requirement of 
diligence on the part of the tip provider, when coupled with the low likelihood 
of receiving an award, may prove a further deterrent for those with valuable 
information to contact the Office. 
The possibility of receiving a cash bounty can only go so far in 
encouraging individuals to come forward with potentially valuable 
information. For the Office’s bounty program to succeed, it needs to 
communicate to the public that its goal is not simply to generate more tips. The 
Office instead needs to show that it can quickly separate useless tips from 
quality information, and then efficiently funnel this information to the 
applicable branch of the SEC. The Office can only truly be considered a 
success when it becomes evident that the number of tips the Office receives 
directly correlates to an increased number of productive investigations and 
effective enforcement actions. 
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